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LAWYERS IN CONTEXT:
MOSES, BRANDEIS AND THE A.B.A.
MILNER S. BALL*
Moses is God's mouth.' The facts that God tries to kill him
and that he is abandoned to an unmarked grave outside the
promised land measure the difficulty of the stories and of repre-
senting God.2
My focus in this article is a small segment of the vast Moses
saga and its moment for a particular instance of practice, lawyer-
ing for the situation. My broader, underlying concern is founda-
tional stories and their shaping presence in our lives. I employ
the plural "stories" because, although biblical narrative is for me
primary, by its very nature it cannot be exclusive or monopolistic.
Its substance and effect are a respect for others that nurtures
receptive, vulnerable listening to their stories.3
I. CONTEXTUAL ETHICS AND STORIES
It should be noted that Thomas Shaffer has long served as
leader at the forefront of those who explore the biblical tradi-
tion's engagement with lawyering, its prophetic challenge to
American Bar Association notions of professionalism and ethics,
and its consequence for such roles as that of counsel for the situ-
ation.4 I happily confess my indebtedness to him even though
the path I follow diverges from his.
* Caldwell Professor of Constitutional Law, University of Georgia School
of Law. Material for Parts I-VI is drawn from CALLED BY STORIES: BIBLICAL
SAGAS AND THEIR CHALLENGE FOR LAW (forthcoming 2000) to be published by
Duke University Press.
1. See infta note 24 and accompanying text.
2. See infra notes 24, 67 and accompanying text.
3. This is not only a matter of tolerance or respect, but also of enlight-
ened self-interest. In the instance of Christianity, other stories have also been
necessary as correctives. For example, "the Marxist critique has been ... neces-
sary for the recovery of Christianity's insistence upon justice in this world ...."
BERNARD DAUENHAUER, PAUL RICOEUR: THE PROMISE AND RISK OF POLITICS 47
(1998). Marx's story may be described as one that recalled Christianity to its
own story, a not unusual effect of listening to others.
4. See, e.g., THOMAS L. SHAFFER, AMERICAN LEGAL ETHICS: TEXT, READINGS,
AND DISCUSSION TOPICs (1985); THOMAS L. SHAFFER, FAITH AND THE PROFESSIONS
(1987); THOMAS L. SHAFFER, ON BEING A CHRISTIAN AND A LAWYER (1981);
Thomas L. Shaffer, The Legal Ethics of Radical Individualism, 65 TEx. L. REv. 963
(1987).
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Shaffer has provided another bracing example of his work in
a recent critique of William Simon's 1998 book, The Practice of
Justice.5 Simon argues that lawyers should practice justice and
that they should do so contextually, and his emphasis on these
subjects is a welcome addition to the literature on lawyering. It is
also a welcome challenge to the established view, according to
which legal ethics and professional responsibility are reduced to
little, categorical rules that leave scant room for the exercise of
moral discretion.
But Simon equates justice with "legal merit."6 Shaffer is
quick to object that, for some of us, justice cannot be so meanly
understood. He notes that for him and others, justice is not
derived from law, cultural morality, or the modern nation-state
but is informed in the first instance by the biblical stories and is
therefore to be understood as righteousness, a "practice follow-
ing upon love of God and neighbor."7
Simon's limited notion ofjustice limits his understanding of
context. In his view contextual decision making requires exam-
ining "the relevant circumstances of the particular case" to deter-
mine what will promote the legal merits.8 In the instance of
whether to recommend a tax avoidance device to a client, for
example, the attorney's careful, lonely examination will include:
interpreting statutory purpose, determining the consistency of
the proposed use of the device with that purpose, finding the
authoritative relevance of court decisions as determined by her
theory of institutional competence, interpreting the purposive
basis of those decisions, reviewing her competence theory, arriv-
ing at a belief about the clarity of the decisional purpose, and
then acting so as not to frustrate a clear statutory-judicial
purpose. 9
Even if an attorney could take these steps without engaging
extra-legal commitments and beliefs-and I do not think she
could-the context takes too little into account. The problem is
not what Simon includes in his recommended inquiry whose
5. Thomas L. Shaffer, Should a Christian Lawyer Sign Up for Simon's Practice
ofJustice?, 51 STAN. L. REv. 903 (1999).
6. WILLIAM SIMON, THE PRACrICE OFJUSTICE: A THEORY OF LAWYERS' ETH-
Ics 138 (1998) (also referred to as "basic values of the legal system"). See also id.
at 10 ("the 'legal merits' of the matter at hand"), 9 ("not an extralegal
concept").
7. Shaffer, supra note 5, at 904. See also Robin West, The Zealous Advocacy
ofJustice in a Less than Ideal World, 51 STAN. L. REv. 973, 976, 982-83, 984-85, 986,
988 (1999) (offering a powerful critique of Simon's limited notion ofjustice).
8. SIMON, supra note 6, at 9.
9. See id. at 146-47.
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rigor is commendable. Rather he includes too little. He
excludes both client participation in the process and what
George Steiner refers to in a different setting as "real
presences."'°
Shaffer knows that an attorney is not deracinated. In
approaching what to do in a particular case, in wrestling with the
decision as Simon would have her do, the attorney does not
come isolated from extra-legal resources. Shaffer observes that
she comes with the resources of her communities outside the
bar. If the attorney is a believer, she comes informed not only by
"notions of equality and freedom" but also by her community's
"centuries of pondering scripture together, of learning together
from theology.... and of communal formation in good habits-
formation influenced by generations of believers ...."11
What I find chiefly characteristic of these communities'
resources is a sense of context far more generous than Simon's:
any situation-personal, institutional, or systemic-is to be dis-
cerned within "what God is doing in the world."1 2 And what God
is doing, Paul Lehmann observed, is "to make and to keep
human life human in the world.""3 The community's texts and
rituals school believers in discernment of this distinctly political
activity of God in the midst of life in order that they may be
drawn into participation in it.
God's politics-His "pressure upon people and events"1-is
always particular and requires specific responses of the believer.
Because the action and the response are case bound, discern-
ment requires careful factual inquiry that may well include rigor-
ous, Simon-like analysis and consideration of rules, law,
principles, and morality. But discernment neither begins nor
ends there. The believer comes with some expectation of the
10. GEORGE STEINER, REAL PRESENCES (1989).
11. Shaffer, supra note 5, at 907.
12. PAUL LEHMANN, ETHICS IN A CHRISTIAN CONTEXT 74 (1963):
There is an obvious pretension in the attempt to write about "what
God is doing in the world." Such an oracular claim... [is inappropri-
ate] to the world of time and space and things. This analysis of what is
involved in Christian thinking about ethics, however, disclaims all
oracular information. It is not by direct, divine illumination, but by
reason of the contextual character of the self-revelatory activity of God
in the church, dialectically understood [that this analysis proceeds]
.... [A]lI that is here claimed to be known is what we read in the
Bible as well as "in the papers."
13. Id. at 99. See also id. at 74-86, 347.
14. Id.
2000]
324 NOTRE DAME JOURNAL OF LAW, ETHICS & PUBLIC POLICY [Vol. 14
"beyond in the midst of our life"15 and some experience in rec-
ognizing it from participation in her community's worship and
theology.16
The fit response in the particular case will only sometimes
be obvious and will always require some greater or lesser leap of
faith. That is why believers are well exhorted to practice
humility, live with uncertainty, engage in mutual critique, and
rely on forgiveness. Here is no room for "ethical literalism which
aims at a one-to-one correlation between" a specific holy text or
rule "and a specific action."17 For the believer, "the environment
of decision, not the rules of decision, gives to behavior its ethical
significance."18 A specific act cannot be said to realize an ethical
principle. A specific act will be ethical insofar as it is a sign that
"points to fundamental human relations which are both funda-
mental and human because of what God is doing in the world."19
A specific act will be ethical if it is indicative of this real, active
presence.
This kind of contextual ethics requires a capacity for apper-
ception developed in various ways-by participation in worship
and theology but also by, among others, stories. In one of his
typically intricate sentences, Paul Lehmann described appercep-
tion as "the uniquely human capacity to know something without
knowing how one has come to know it, and to bring what one
knows in this way to what one knows in other ways, and in so
doing, to discern what is humanly true or false."2 His descrip-
tion works best as a performance of its subject. He wagered that
readers would have had some experience of apperception and
would therefore be able to catch his meaning without knowing
exactly how or what.
Arthur Danto has a different way of talking about the same
subject. He says that one cannot become, for example, a temper-
ate person by doing things from a list of things temperate people
do. "[T] he having of the list is inconsistent with being that sort
of person."21 He says that what it takes instead is intuition and
the ability to judge and act appropriately in situations not
15. DIETRICH BONHOEFFER, LETTERS AND PAPERS FROM PRISON 155 (Eber-
hard Bethge ed. & Frank Clarke trans., 3d ed. 1967).
16. See Shaffer, supra note 5, at 906 n.24.
17. LEHMANN, supra note 12, at 346-47.
18. Id. at 347.
19. Id.
20. PAUL LEHMANN, THE DECALOGUE AND A HUMAN FUTURE 23 (1994).
21. ARTHUR DANTO, THE TRANSFIGURATION OF THE COMMONPLACE: A PHI-
LOSOPHY OF ART 202 (1981).
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encountered before.22 Rather than self-help lists-say something
like the seven habits of highly successful people-Danto con-
cludes that we require examples "to direct the development of
judgment, which is to carry its possessor through unstructured
moral and legal spaces. 'Examples are thus the go-cart of the
understanding'. .. ".3
I put the matter somewhat differently. In place of "intui-
tion" and "examples," I would say that "apperception" is what it
takes and that "stories" are the go-carts. But the aspiration is the
same. I, too, would have understanding, the development of
judgment, and the enlivening of imagination-the things that
carry us through the unstructured places of the world and the
heart. And that is why I have turned to the saga of Moses.
II. MOUTH FOR GOD
The Moses in the biblical text is a complex figure of many
parts, but he is foremost a person of the law. The text does not
say that he is a lawyer. It says that he is "mouth" (peh) for God.
He speaks for God.24
22. See id.
23. Id. (quoting Kant).
24. There is a certain amount of risk in the use of the translation "mouth
for." It may entail a prejudicial assumption of meaning. The Hebrew peh,
"mouth," may well have been thought of and therefore may well have been
something very different in ancient Israel than the mouth is for us.
In addition, "mouth for" may elicit misleading or limiting associations: the
lawyer as mouthpiece. The Oxford English Dictionary indicates that "mouth-
piece" is a late-developing word, especially as slang for a solicitor. And "mouth
for" scarcely has the original sense of that part of a musical instrument made
for blowing through.
The image of the mouth was employed by Judge Learned Hand in a more
elevated sense. He said that "[t]he judge's authority depends on the assump-
tion that he speaks with the mouth of others...." WilliamJ. Brennan, The Role
of the Court-The Challenge of the Future, in AN AFFAIR WITH FREEDOM: A COLLEC-
TION OF His OPINIONS AND SPEECHES FROM His FIRST DECADE AS A UNITED
STATES SUPREME COURT JUSTICE 315, 324 (Stephen J. Friedman ed., 1967).
Hand's point was that judges are charged to decide cases according to law and
not simply according to the politics of the moment. They must therefore draw
around themselves the legitimating figures of the past. As Hand's sentence
develops, however, various mixings of metaphors underscore his idea that
judges must enrobe themselves in something other than a contemporary
politics:
The judge's authority depends upon the assumption that he speaks
with the mouth of others, that is to say, the momentum of his utter-
ances must be greater than any which his personal reputation and
character can command, if it is to do the work assigned to it-if it is to
stand against the passionate resentments arising out of the interests he
must frustrate-for while a judge must discover some composition
20001
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God introduces the image of the mouth in His first, strange
encounter with Moses. God speaks to him from a burning bush
and tells him to return to Egypt to deliver the Israelites from slav-
ery. Moses is reluctant and, among other things, objects that he
is a poor speaker. In response God explains: "I will be with your
mouth and teach you what to speak."25 The image returns at the
conclusion of the exchange when Moses' truculent self-efface-
ment at last makes God angry. Enough humility is enough. To
Moses' "send someone else," God answers that He will send
Aaron as a companion: "You shall speak to [Aaron] and put the
words in his mouth; and I will be with your mouth and with his
mouth .... [H]e shall serve as a mouth for you and you shall
serve as God for him."26 Moses is to God as Aaron is to Moses: "a
mouth for."27 God gives Moses the words he is to speak, and
Moses speaks them to the Pharaoh ("Let my people go") and to
the people. Moses says he stands "between the Lord and [Israel]
to declare to you the words of the Lord."2
That God provides a mouth for Himself is the cardinal gift
of enablement to His people. He is characteristically present to
them as word. God talks. In the texts, He calls to Moses from the
bush and later speaks to him all the words of the law. His voice is
to be obeyed.29 He creates by word. He speaks the world into
being: "God said, 'Let there be light'; and there was light."30
with the dominant trends of his times, he must preserve his authority
by cloaking himself in the majesty of an overshadowing past.
Id. At 324. Judge Hand's use of the image of a "mouth of" is more ennobling
than "mouthpiece," but it is nonetheless different from the Mosaic "mouth for."
Moses' authority depends upon his serving as mouth for another greater than
himself, but, unlike Hand's judge, he does not "cloak" himself with this mouth.
Among other differences, the active party is God. God makes Moses His mouth.
And the act is not an attempt by God to preserve His authority. It is an act of
courtesy.
"Mouth for God" has the advantage of some relation to but no exact match
with other conventional terms for the lawyer. For example, it does not exactly
fit within any of Thomas Shaffer's (and Robert Cochran's) categories: the law-
yer as godfather, or as hired gun, or as guru, or as friend. See THOMAS L. SItAF-
FER & ROBERT F. COCHRAN, JR., LAWYERS, CLIENTS, AND MORAL RESPONSIBILITY
(1994).
On the notion of representation, see HANNA FENICHEL PITKIN, THE CON-
CEPT OF REPRESENTATION (1967); REPRESENTATION: NoMos X (J. Roland Pen-
nock & John W. Chapman eds., 1968).
25. Exod. 4:12.
26. Id. 4:15-16.
27. Moses is also "God for" Aaron. While the designation elevates him
above Aaron, it is also a reminder that Moses is, in turn, subordinate to God.
28. Deut. 5:5.
29. See Exod. 19:5.
30. Gen. 1:3.
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The word of God can be destructive and terrifying. When the
people hear the sound of His speaking at Sinai, they are afraid
and tremble and stand at a distance. They cannot withstand His
words spoken directly to them. God speaks through Moses so
that the people can bear His speaking. Through this mouth He
is present to His people without consuming them.
III. MOUTH FOR THE PEOPLE
Sometimes, however, especially in the events surrounding
Mt. Sinai when God gives the words of the law to Moses for the
people, Moses represents the people before God. He is never
designated "mouth for" them, but on these occasions he appears
to act as their mouth, rather than God's. Openly and explicitly in
the text he intercedes with God on their behalf."' He does so
movingly and effectively. He persuades God to change His mind,
and he saves the people from mighty acts of divine retribution.
These intercessions appear to be spontaneous and to lack
express authorization by either the people or God. They raise
the question: For whom does Moses then speak? The question
admits of no easy answer.
There are three acute instances of intercession.32 The first
occurs just after God gives Moses two tablets of stone on which
He has inscribed the Ten Commandments. The narrative of
events taking place atop Mt. Sinai is interrupted by the story of
idolatry taking place below. In Moses' absence, the people have
lapsed into the worship of a golden calf. God tells Moses to go
down at once. God wishes to be left alone so that His "wrath may
burn hot against them" without intrusion." Moses, disobedient,
delays. In that critical circumstance, before he will leave, he will
first pause to argue, like a lawyer appearing before an angry
judge and refusing to be overpowered:
0 Lord, why does your wrath burn hot against your people,
whom you brought out of the land of Egypt with great
power and with a mighty hand? Why should the Egyptians
say, "It was with evil intent that he brought them out to kill
them in the mountains, and to consume them from the
31. For the references to a similar office in Job, see Job 16:20 (witness?);
33:23 (mediator, interpreter?); 19:25 (vindicator, advocate, redeemer?). See
also 15 THE ANCHOR BIBLE: JOB 146 (Marvin Pope ed. & trans., 1975).
32. There are also later intercessions on the way to Canaan: on behalf of
Miriam after her rebellion, see Num. 12; on behalf of the people in conjunction
with Korah's rebellion, see Num. 16:22; for relief from snakes, see Num. 21:4-9);
and on behalf of the people at the border of Canaan that a successor to himself
be appointed lest the people be sheep without a shepherd, see Num. 27: 16-17.
33. Exod. 32:10.
2000]
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face of the earth?" Turn from your fierce wrath; change
your mind and do not bring disaster on your people.
Remember Abraham, Isaac, and Israel, your servants, how
you swore to them by your own self, saying to them, "I will
multiply your descendants like the stars of heaven, and all
this land that I have promised I will give to your descend-
ants, and they shall inherit it forever." 4
In response to these arguments that Moses makes from reputa-
tion and covenant, "the Lord changed his mind about the disas-
ter that he planned to bring on his people." 5 Only then does
Moses descend the mountain to contend with the idolators.
The second intercessory moment in the Sinai sequence soon
follows. As Moses approaches the encampment and sees Israel
enthralled by the golden calf, he smashes the two tablets of stone
bearing the Ten Commandments. He then destroys the golden
calf and conducts a purge of the sinners. He still fears what God
will do to the people who remain. He returns to the mountain to
"make atonement" for them. 6 Instead of offering arguments
this time, he employs a different tactic of a type employed by
modem lawyers: He confesses the people's guilt and enters a
plea for mercy. He is partially successful. God agrees to let the
people continue on their journey to the promised land, but He
also vows to punish the guilty "when the day comes." 7 In the
meantime He sends a plague upon them. When the day does
34. Id. 32:11-13. For an interesting account of Moses' argument, see
YOCHANAN MUFFS, LoVE &Joy- LAw, LANGUAGE AND RELIGION IN ANCIENT ISRAEL
12-13 (1992) (God refers to the Israelites as "your" (Moses') people; Moses
refers to them as "your" (God's) people).
35. Exod. 32:11-14. One of the intercession's arguments is based on the
covenant: if you destroy this people, you will default on your promises.
Another relates to reputation: what will the Egyptians say? This argument will
be repeated and elaborated in a later intercession for Israel when, after advance
spies return from the promised land with unflattering, fearful reports of what
awaits them, the people attempt a democratic rebellion: "'Let us choose a cap-
tain, and let us return into Egypt.'" Num. 14:4. Moses and Aaron entreat them
to desist, they do not, and, in terms reminiscent of the Mt. Sinai episode, God
vows to do away with them. See Num. 14:12. Thereupon Moses argues to God:
[T]he Egyptians will hear of it... and they will tell the inhabitants of
this land.., then the nations who have heard about it will say, "It is
because the Lord was not able to bring this people into the land that
he swore to give them that he has slaughtered them in the wilderness."
Num. 14:13-16. Rumor and public relations have their uses and together with
covenantal promises persuade God to change his mind in the Numbers as well as
the Exodus text.
36. Exod. 32:30.
37. Id. 32:31-35. Caleb andJoshua are the sole exceptions. See Deut. 1:35-
38; Num. 32:11-12.
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come, the pioneers must die in the desert short of the promised
land. Only the next generation will be allowed to enter, but they
will enter.
The third intercession occurs when God orders the people
to set out for the promised land but, apparently still nursing His
fury, says He will send an angel before them but will not Himself
go with them. His absence would clearly be a catastrophe. With-
out Him, Israel would be defenseless against her enemies in the
desert. Moses appeals to God. The place of encounter has
shifted from the mountain top to a special tent, the tent of meet-
ing, pitched outside the base camp. A pillar of cloud there has
replaced the thunderstorms on the mountain, and the turbu-
lence of Israel's idolatry has given way to calm: "When Moses
entered the tent, the pillar of cloud would descend . . .and the
Lord would speak with Moses.... Thus the Lord used to speak to
Moses face to face, as one speaks to a friend."3" In this setting
Moses now addresses to God a quietly personal, yet cunning
argument that touches on his relationship to God, on God's
prior statements, and again on God's reputation:
See, you have said to me, "Bring up this people"; but you
have not let me know whom you will send with me. Yet you
have said, "I know you by name, and you have also found
favor in my sight." Now if I have found favor in your sight,
show me your ways, so that I may know you and find favor
in your sight. Consider too that this nation is your
people.9
God is persuaded and interrupts to say so. He says that His pres-
ence will be in attendance on the journey after all.4 ° But Moses,
like a lawyer who would rather argue than succeed, seems not to
hear and continues: "how shall it be known that I have found
favor in your sight, I and your people, unless you go with us? In
this way, we shall be distinct, I and your people, from every peo-
ple on the face of the earth."'" God consents once more.4 2
Moses will represent Israel before God on later occasions,
but these three, decisive instances more than justify Jeremiah's
38. Exod. 33:9,11.
39. Id. 33:12-13.
40. Muffs reads God's statement somewhat differently: God agrees here
only to send His angel, not Himself. See MUFFS, supra note 34, at 14-16.
41. Exod. 33:12-16.
42. "What is clear from the motivating appeals of Moses is that the prayer
is not for an arbitrary or inconsistent action on God's part. It is a prayer for
God to act according to the divine will and purpose as it has been manifest over
and over again ...." Patrick Miller, Moses, My Servant: A Deuteronomic Portrait of
Moses, 41 INTERPRETATION 245, 253 (1987).
2000]
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memory of Moses as one of Israel's greatest intercessors.43 At
Sinai a great divide opens between God and the people. Moses is
in the middle, and three times this mouth for God must speak
for the people to God.4 4
IV. COUNSEL FOR THE SITUATION
When Moses stands there in the middle, representing God
to the people and the people to God, he may act as what modem
lawyers call "counsel for the situation." In order to explore the
possibility, I must give a brief account of the history and signifi-
cance of the relevant professional terms, and this means momen-
tarily shifting focus from the strange story to the different but no
less strange discourse of lawyers and of academic writing about
the practice of law.
The notion of "counsel for the situation" is important in the
practice of American law because it runs counter to the domi-
nant idea that a lawyer in our adversarial system must always per-
form as a zealous advocate for an individual client's interests
against all others. This dominant approach is well-justified. A
person needs a lawyer whose competence, diligence, confidence,
enthusiasm, and undivided loyalty she can rely on.
Nevertheless a lawyer's scorched-earth advancement of an
individual client's interest is not always the need. For example, a
family may want a single attorney to represent them as a whole
for various reasons. (John Frank said that nothing requires
"each of the relatives of the deceased to take different counsel to
the funeral: if a half-dozen heirs were required to pay a half-
dozen counsel, they would indeed have additional grounds for
grief."'45 ) A group of business people may seek a lawyer to repre-
sent their joint interests as they undertake a common enterprise.
Clients with a present or potential dispute may be determined to
resolve their differences amicably and may turn to their attorney
for her professional service.
"Counsel for the situation" is a way of thinking about such
occasions, and in alliance with the idea that lawyers ought to
serve the interest of the people and not the interests of large
corporations only, it is also a way of introducing into discussion
of lawyers' responsibility a possible obligation to communities, to
43. "Then the Lord said to me: Though Moses and Samuel stood before
me, yet my heart would not turn toward this people." Jer. 15:1.
44. See Deut. 5:5. See also MICHAL WALZER, EXODUS AND REVOLuriON 95
(1985).
45. John P. Frank, The Legal Ethics of Louis D. Brandeis, 17 STAN. L. REv.
683, 697 (1965).
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relationships, to the public good, to something in addition to an
individual client's interests. Thomas Shaffer has fruitfully called
attention to these possibilities.46
Louis Brandeis invented the term "counsel for the situation"
to describe some of his work.4" He also advocated the role of
people's lawyer and was known for playing that role sometimes
himself.4" His heroic image continues to inspire public interest
lawyering.49
Brandeis became an Associate Justice of the Supreme Court
after surviving opposition at contentious hearings on his nomina-
tion in 1916.5o Although the opposition to him by leaders of the
bar may actually have gone to the fact that he was "an intellectu-
ally powerful liberal and aJew," its ostensible subject was his pro-
fessional conduct.5'
The term "counsel for the situation" was introduced publicly
during the 1916 hearings, but the story of it begins with an epi-
46. See supra note 4. See also DAVID LUBAN, LAWYERS AND JUSTICE: AN ETHI-
CAL STUDY (1988); William H. Simon, Visions of Practice in Legal Thought, 36
STAN. L. REV. 469 (1984); David B. Wilkins, Who Should Regulate Lawyers?, 105
HARV. L. REV. 799 (1992).
Clyde Spillenger has a good description of lawyering for the situation:
It is to recognize and respect certain organic bonds, like family and
other relationships, as deserving of representation. It is to suggest that
the lawyer should be able to act as intermediary in situations that
involve multiple but not necessarily adverse interests.... Sometimes
the phrase refers to the role of lawyers as social reformers-making
"the situation" synonymous with "the public" or "the public good."
Clyde Spillenger, Elusive Advocate: Reconsidering Brandeis as People's Lawyer, 105
YALE L.J. 1445, 1502 (1996).
47. See John Dzienkowski, Lawyers as Intermediaries: The Representation of
Multiple Clients in the Modern Legal Profession, 1992 U. ILL. L. REV. 741, 748-53
(1993); Frank, supra note 45, at 698-703; Spillenger, supra note 46, at 1504-05
n.208. For a very interesting reflection on Brandeis in relation to Moses, see
ROBERT BURT, Two JEWISH JUSTICES: OUTCASTS IN THE PROMISED LAND 124-26
(1988).
48. Brandeis said: "We hear much of the 'corporation lawyer,' and far
too little of the 'people's lawyer.' The great opportunity of the American Bar is
and will be to stand again as it did in the past, ready to protect also the interests
of the people." Louis D. BRANDEIS, THE OPPORTUNITY IN THE LAW, IN Busi-
NEss-A PROFESSION 329, 337 (1933) (1905 address to the Harvard Ethical Soci-
ety). On images of Brandeis as "attorney for the people," see Spillenger, supra
note 46, at 1471 n.83, 1481 n.121, 1502-03.
49. See LUBAN, supra note 46; Spillenger, supra note 46.
50. See generally ALPHEUS THOMAS MASON, BRANDEIS, A FREE MAN'S LIFE
491-508 (1946); PHILIPPA STRUM, LOUIS D. BRANDEIS: JUSTICE FOR THE PEOPLE
291-308 (1984); A.L. TODD, JUSTICE ON TRIAL: THE CASE OF LOUIS D. BRANDEIS
96-237 (1964).
51. GEOFFREY C. HAZARD, JR., ETHICS IN THE PRACTICE OF LAw 58-59
(1978).
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sode that took place in 1907.52 A tannery had accumulated large
debts and could not meet the payments when they fell due. An
owner of the business, James Lennox, together with one of his
creditors and the creditor's attorney, sought Brandeis' advice.
(Brandeis' firm represented one of the other creditors.) In the
course of the conference, Brandeis determined that the tannery
was insolvent and suggested that the assets be assigned to his law
partner as trustee for the benefit of creditors in hope of saving
the business from bankruptcy. Lennox adopted Brandeis' sug-
gestion but did not understand that he was thereby gaining a
trustee for the firm's property rather than a lawyer for himself.
In the complexities that followed, bankruptcy became necessary,
and Brandeis' firm represented the petitioning creditors in those
proceedings. Lennox felt betrayed and retained another Boston
lawyer, Sherman Whipple, to investigate.
Whipple met with Brandeis and later recounted the meeting
at the 1916 hearings. He remembered Brandeis saying, among
other things:
When a man is bankrupt and cannot pay his debts.... he
finds himself with a trust, imposed upon him by law, to see
that all his property is distributed honestly and fairly and
equitably among all his creditors, and he has no further
interest in the matter. Such was Mr. Lennox's situation
when he came to me, and he consulted me merely as the
trustee for his creditors, as to how best to discharge that
trust, and I advised him in that way. I did not intend to act
personally for Mr. Lennox, nor did I agree to. 'Yes," I said,
"but you advised him to make the assignment. For whom
were you counsel when you advised him to do that, if not
for the Lennoxes?" He said, "I should say that I was coun-
sel for the situation .... I was looking after the interests of
everyone."5
3
In 1965 John Frank revisited the nomination hearings and
Brandeis' action. He concluded that Brandeis had violated no
standard of professional ethics, but he agreed with Whipple's
criticism that Brandeis should have made clearer to Lennox what
he was proposing.54 Frank also thought that counsel for the situ-
52. See Dzienkowski, supra note 47, at 750-53; Frank, supra note 45, at 699-
703; Spillenger, supra note 46, at 1505-11.
53. Hearings Before the Subcommittee of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary on
the Nomination of Louis D. Brandeis To Be an Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of
the United States, 64th Cong., 1st Sess., 287 (1916).
54. See Frank, supra note 45, at 702.
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ation was a "misty phrase" and "one of the most unfortunate...
[Brandeis] ever casually uttered."55
Notwithstanding its colorable, inauspicious origin, the
notion has survived doggedly and honorably. Reputable lawyers
who were contemporaries of Brandeis had done the same thing,
and lawyers still do.56 In 1978, Geoffrey Hazard commended the
practice as "perhaps the best service a lawyer can render to any-
one."57 Hazard argued that lawyering for the situation could be
officially defined and should be officially recognized. When Haz-
ard wrote, the American Bar Association had offered little gui-
dance on the subject.
The ABA adopted its first set of standards, the Canons of Pro-
fessional Ethics, at just about the time of Brandeis' involvement
with Lennox and the tannery. Of these thirty-two aspirational
Canons, one held that it was "unprofessional to represent con-
flicting interests, except by express consent of all concerned
given after a full disclosure of the facts."58 Beyond this, the
Canons did not address what Brandeis and others were doing in
situational representation.
In 1969 the ABA adopted a Model Code of Professional
Responsibility that offered something more. According to one of
its "disciplinary rules," lawyers may represent multiple clients if
they provide full disclosure and "can adequately represent the
interests of each."59 One of the accompanying "ethical consider-
ations" also provided that lawyers may serve as arbitrators or
mediators for clients.6° This is more than the earlier Canons
offered, but not much clearer or more helpful.61 Hazard said
55. Id. Dzienkowski says: "One could interpret [it] in many different
ways." Dzienkowski, supra note 47, at 752. Spillenger believes it "was not the
expression of a lawyering metaphysic but a hurried and embarrassed response
to a question put to him by hostile counsel." Spillenger, supra note 46, at 1507.
56. The charge against Brandeis "did not so much collapse as become
submerged in concessions from other reputable lawyers that they had often
done exactly as Brandeis." HAzARD, supra note 51, at 61. Lawyers told Hazard
that lawyering to the situation described settings in which they had found them-
selves. See id." at 61-62.
57. Id. at 65. See also id. at 7, 61-62; Spillenger, supra note 46, at 1503-04.
58. CANONS OF PROFESSIONAL ETHICS Canon 6 (1908).
59. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBLITY DR 5-105(c) (1982).
The "ethical considerations" that accompanied the rule expressed concern for
a lawyer's independence ofjudgment and loyalty to her client but accepted the
propriety of representing multiple clients with differing interests outside the
context of litigation so long as there was full disclosure and client consent. See
id. EC 5-14 to 5-16.
60. Id. EC 5-20.
61. See HAzARD, supra note 51, at 62-64; Dzienkowski, supra note 47, at
759-62.
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that it allowed "only a fragment of [lawyering for the situation],
and with some reluctance at that."6 2
Hazard became the reporter for the next installment, the
1983 Model Rules of Professional Conduct, produced by an ABA
commission. His influence is to be detected in Rule 2.2 which
allows a lawyer to "serve as an impartial arbitrator or mediator
between clients."6" Thomas Shaffer believes that the rule is
stingy and not as generous as Brandeis would have wanted but
useful nonetheless. In his judgment it bears possibilities for
understanding that lawyers may represent families and other
communities and, in doing so, represent the harmonies of the
relationships.6'
Meanwhile a committee of the American Law Institute,
which Hazard now directs, has been at work on a Restatement of the
Law Governing Lawyers. The 1996 final draft of the Restatement
abandons the modest effort of Rule 2.2 on the grounds that the
rule did not mean what it seemed to say and that, in any event,
the term "intermediation" had not entered the professional
vocabulary.65 And a more recent commission, appointed by the
ABA to review the Model Rules, agrees. It proposes eliminating
Rule 2.2, replacing "intermediation" with 'joint representation,"
and viewing the latter as a problem to be dealt with under the
rule governing conflict of interest.6 6
62. HAZARD, supra note 51, at 62.
63. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 2.2 (1992). Consulta-
tion and consent are required. There are other conditions, including reason-
able beliefs that the undertaking will be successful and that there is little risk of
prejudice to the clients' individual interests if it is not. See id. Rule 2.2 (a) (1) to
(3). Each client must be able to make informed decisions, and the lawyer must
believe that her representation will be impartial as well as compatible with her
responsibilities to the individual clients.
Rule 1.7 is the general conflict of interest rule. For commentary on that
rule and its relation to Rule 2.2, see Teresa Stanton Collett, The Ethics of
Intergenerational Representation, 62 FORDHAM L. REV. 1453 (1994); Russell G.
Pearce, Family Values and Legal Ethics: Competing Approaches to Conflicts in Repr-
senting Spouses, 62 FoRDHAM L. REV. 1253 (1994). One learned commentator
believes that the rule constitutes an improvement but that it "leaves many fun-
damental questions unresolved." Dzienkowski, supra note 47, at 745.
64. My representation of Shaffer is drawn from my correspondence with
him and from his well-taken, influential treatment of the subject in Shaffer,
supra note 4.
65. See Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers §211 cmt. a
(Proposed Final Draft No. 1, March 29, 1996) [hereinafter RESTATEMENT]
("Although its terminology might be thought to imply otherwise, Rule 2.2
addresses a particular setting for applying the general rules governing
conflicts.").
66. See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Proposed Rule 1.7 cmts.
27-32 (Proposed Draft, Mar. 23, 1999); id. Proposed Rule 2.2.
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At present, lawyering for the situation stands just about
where the 1969 Model Code left it: without much positive gui-
dance.6" It remains what Hazard described as "marginally illicit
professional conduct, much as it was when Brandeis engaged
in it at the beginning of the century.
Lawyers do serve as counsel for the situation and will con-
tinue to do so, even though the practice is probably destined to
remain marginally illicit.69 This is as it should be. A rule legiti-
mating the practice, if the bar were to achieve a consensus on
such a rule, would nonetheless be a rule, and no rule can carry a
lawyer through the unstructured spaces of the situations at
issue.7"
Brandeis intended no evil. He sought only to maintain his
own autonomy," but that desire may have compromised his rep-
resentation. In a careful reassessment of Brandeis' practice,
Clyde Spillenger finds that autonomy and high-mindedness were
specifically characteristic of Brandeis' lawyering for a situation.
Brandeis typically sought to be fair to all and to harmonize com-
peting interests. Typically, however, the fairness and harmony he
sought were not what a sensitive inquiry into the goals and needs
of the parties revealed. Rather, he "saw a 'situation' that he
could solve, in the manner of a good Progressive problem-
solver-a 'one-man New Deal'-and he sought to impose a solu-
tion that made reference less to the expressed desires of the par-
67. The Restatement basically returns to the 1969 Model Code's require-
ment of consent and adequate representation. Sections 209 and 210 cover,
respectively, representation of multiple parties in civil and in criminal litigation.
See RESTATEMENT, supra note 65, at §§ 209, 210. Section 211 covers multiple
representation in non-litigation contexts. See id. at § 211. All three allow for
representation of multiple parties where the clients consent. Client consent is
covered by section 202 which requires that a client's consent be based on "rea-
sonably adequate information about the material risks of such representation."
Id. at § 202. This section also provides that, notwithstanding'consent, it must
nevertheless be "reasonably likely that the lawyer will be able to provide ade-
quate representation." Id.
68. HAZARD, supra note 51, at 64.
69. Dzienkowski warns that Brandeis' concept is "no longer viable in the
modern legal profession." Dzienkowski, supra note 47, at 748.
70. Hazard notes that bar association advisory opinions are abstract and
dogmatic and, as "clean-cut answers to hypothetical problems," not really illumi-
nating "for the messy ethical questions of real life." HAZARD, supra note 51, at
60.
71. He simply "saw himself," Robert Burt suggests, "standing alone at the
margin of his society" where he resisted affiliation with groups, causes, and cli-
ents, and preserved his autonomy. BURT, supra note 47, at 9.
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ties involved than to a vision nurtured by and known only to
himself."72
Lawyering for the situation is a tricky business, trickiest of
all, perhaps, for those who, like the heroic Brandeis, intend to do
good by engaging in it.73 In representing a detached vision of his
own, Brandeis was above the situation and not in it. His vision
could be a good vision with good intentions and good results. It
was nonetheless his own.
The ABA's 1983 Model Rule 2.2, that allows attorneys to act
as intermediaries-the official version of lawyering to a situa-
tion-expresses some concern for the extra risks to which clients
are exposed in these circumstances. The interpretive comments
that follow the rule thus direct the lawyer to be mindful of addi-
tional costs, embarrassment, and recrimination that failure could
produce for clients.7 ' But the lawyer is not thought of as having
anything at stake. The rules say nothing about her venturing
herself. Or her fee. If the attorney takes the job and in the pro-
cess foresees trouble, she is directed simply to withdraw, appar-
ently with her fee and her reputation for independence intact.
The implied ideal is that of an attorney, like Brandeis, situated
72. Spillenger, supra note 46, at 1509. This is to specify and extend Rob-
ert Burt's observation that "Brandeis always turned away; he always found a
place to stand alone." BURT, supra note 47, at 9.
73. Dzienkowski notes:
[In these instances] the clients bear a risk that is not present in other
types of representations. This risk relates primarily to the fact that the
lawyer does not owe his or her loyalty exclusively to one client's inter-
ests. Further, most intermediations arise outside of the litigation con-
text, and thus are not supervised by an impartial trier of fact or law.
Dzienkowski, supra note 47, at 775 n.184.
Derrick Bell noted about civil rights lawyers in the 1970's: "Idealism,
though rarer than greed, can be especially hard to control" and can be espe-
cially dangerous. Derrick A. Bell, Serving Two Masters: Integration Ideals and Cli-
ent Interests in School Desegregation Litigation, 85 YALE L.J. 470, 504 (1976).
Owen Fiss noted about one lawyer for the situation in the abolitionist
cause: "In invoking humanity's interest in freedom, Dana [stood] in danger of
substituting his own conception of the good-or that of the privileged group to
which he belongs-for that of the collectivities he [purported] to represent."
Owen M. Fiss, Can a Lawyer Ever Do Right?, 17 CARDozo L. REV. 1859, 1862
(1996).
74. See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 2.2 cmt. (1983).
The rule itself provides that, before a lawyer acts as an intermediary, she must
believe that there is little risk of prejudice to client interests if she fails to
achieve success. See id.
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above the situation, detached from the clients and the joint
75enterprise. 7
Geoffrey Hazard had a contrary view back in 1978: An attor-
ney may be entrusted with the role of intermediary "only if he
knows that in the event of miscarriage he will have no protection
from the law" and only if success prevents his performance from
being questioned afterwards. 76 I read Hazard's admonition to
mean that an attorney may be entrusted with the role only if she
is fully, vulnerably invested in the situation-like Moses.
V. MULTIPLE VOICES
Moses never surrenders his office as mouth for God. He is
as aligned with God as a mortal can be. And yet he is aligned
with the people and speaks for them.77 When he stands at the
outermost reaches close to God-the text gives it geographical
location on the mountaintop surrounded by a cloud-he is phys-
ically separated from the people but not humanly detached from
them. His identification with them takes poignant form in the
narrative.
Just when God finishes speaking the law to Moses and gives
him the stone tablets, the people's idolatry interrupts. In His
fury, God would be let alone "so that my wrath may burn hot
against them and I may consume them. '7' But that is not all that
God says. He has a last comment. He will consume the people,
"and of you," He adds, speaking to Moses, "I will make a great
nation. 79
75. Such detachment is not on its face an unsound idea. There are cir-
cumstances when an attorney should be independent. But Spillenger makes a
well-taken point:
[T]he Lennoxes of this world probably fall in the vast middle of a
universe of clients bounded by 'powerful, amoral corporations' (from
which a lawyer should exercise independence), on one side, and 'dis-
empowered individuals' (with whom a lawyer should engage in
empathetic dialogue), on the other. A lawyerly ethic that counsels
independence from a client's unlawful or immoral goals does little to
explain Brandeis's instincts in the Lennox case-his lack of interest in
solutions other than his own.
Spillenger, supra note 46, at 1510-11.
76. HAZARD, supra note 51, at 67.
77. Hanna Pitkin establishes and elaborates two basic types of representa-
tion: that of mandate and that of independence. See PITKIN, supra note 24. In
speaking for God and the people, Moses performs in both instances a role that
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Moses lingers. His response is to say nothing about the offer
of a kingdom of his own. He pleads instead for the people, for
the nation that is his now, such as it is. This is the first of his
great intercessions on the people's behalf, and it changes God's
mind. Arthur Jacobson notes about the moment that "[t]he
highest political drama .. .is whether Moses will become a new
Pharaoh."8 ° He does not.8'
When Moses returns to the mountain to make atonement
for the people's sin and to intercede powerfully for them the sec-
ond time, what he says is: "'Alas, this people has sinned a great
sin; they have made for themselves gods of gold. But now, if you
will only forgive their sin-but if not, blot me out of the book
that you have written.' 8 2
This is not simply to resist the offer to become a new Pha-
raoh. Moses now places himself fully with the people. God has
written a book. If God is to destroy the people, Moses asks to be
erased from the book. No longer to be written in God's book is
more than to have resisted the Pharaonic temptation and worse
than to be unremembered. It is not to have existed at all. Moses
risks all that he has and is.
Moses' advocacy in this situation poses a difficulty of inter-
pretation. Is he to be read as both mouth for God and voice of
the people? If so, does he slip from one role into another? Is he
duplicitous?
The problem can be resolved by saying simply that Moses
speaks for the situation. Along this line it can be noted that he
identifies with and pleads for "this" people, not "these" people,
and therefore for the collective, for the enterprise, for both God
80. Arthur Jacobson, The Idolatry of Rules: Writing Law According to. Moses
with.Reference to Other Jurisprudences, 11 CARozo L. REv. 1097-98 (1990). Jacob-
son's underlying point is that Freud got it backwards. Freud proposed that
Moses was a distinguished Egyptian who joined a group of culturally inferior
immigrants. See SIGMUND FREUD, MOSES AND MONOTHEISM (1939). "The text is
not hiding the secret that Moses was an Egyptian prince. Moses is telling us that
he risked setting up as Pharaoh." Jacobson, supra, at 1097-98.
81. Christian tradition singles out for celebration and memory Moses'
resistance to forms of the Pharaonic temptation: "By faith, Moses, when he was
grown up, refused to be called a son of Pharaoh's daughter, choosing rather to
share ill-treatment with the people of God than to enjoy the fleeting pleasures
of sin." Heb. 11:24-25.
Moses' resistance to the Pharaonic temptation renders especially ironic the
claims of the rebels that he had engineered the exodus for his own purposes.
See Num. 16:12-14. Compare Num. 10:29-32, with Num. 13, and James S. Acker-
man, Numbers, in THE LITERARY GUIDE TO THE BIBLE 80, 83 (Robert Alter &
Frank Kermode eds., 1987) [hereinafter LITERARY GUIDE]. See also Num. 11:1 lff.
82. Exod. 32:31-32. God's response begins: "Whoever has sinned against
me I will blot out of my book." Id. 32:33.
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and people together. Or it can be argued that acting as an inter-
mediary sometimes requires representing one party to another
or changing roles within a developing situation. This reading
solves the problem of double voice but only by raising it to a
higher level, from Moses to God: If Moses speaks for the situa-
tion, he still acts as God's mouth, but then he speaks for a forgiv-
ing God and an angry God.83 In the stories, God certainly acts as
first the one and then the other by turns. And Moses' interces-
sions succeed in convincing God to change from one to the
other. God does respond to intercession on the people's behalf.
This is a valid reading. I take a somewhat different
approach. I think that Moses' intercessions at Sinai are genu-
inely intercessory, are prayers to God for the people, because
they arise out of the word of God: Moses is mouth for the people
exactly because he is mouth for God.
VI. ONE VOICE, MULTIPLE RisKs
At the beginning, at the burning bush, Moses objects: "I
have never been eloquent" and God answers: "Who gives speech
to mortals? ... Go and I will be with your mouth and teach you
what you are to speak."84 God supplies Moses with the words he
speaks to the Pharaoh and to the people. He also supplies Moses
with the words Moses speaks to God. God's word returns to Him
as intercession.
Moses' first intercession at Sinai is a precise example. He
has made several roundtrips to the mountain summit. As chap-
ter 32 of Exodus opens, the reader assumes that Moses has
returned to the top for the last time. There is expectation that
the vertical movement of ascending and descending will now
translate into horizontal progress across the desert plain and that
the energy of exchanges between summit and base will now fuel
the long march forward to Canaan.
83. Yochanan Muffs proposes that the prophet is not only the messenger
from the heavenly court but also an independent advocate to the court whose
prayer and intercession seek rescission of the "evil" decree: "He is first the mes-
senger of the divine court to the defendant, but his mission boomerangs back
to the sender. Now, he is no longer the messenger of the court; he becomes
the agent of the defendant, attempting to mitigate the severity of the decree."
Muls, supra note 34, at 9. God is then imagined as subject to conflicting emo-
tions of justice and mercy:
If there is no balance in the divine emotion, ifjustice gets the upper
hand over mercy, then the world is placed in great danger. Therefore,
God allows the prophet to represent in his prayer His own attribute of
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Already from prior exchanges, law has come down the
mountain in oral form and been agreed to and set out in writ-
ing." Already there has been a promise that, with this law in
their midst and with the doing of it, the people will be led by an
angel and that terror, confusion, and pestilence will precede
them to cut a path of destruction through their enemies.86
It remains only for Moses to descend with the two tablets of
stone and to deposit them in the mobile ark. Then, with produc-
tion of the required equipment completed, Israel will be set in
motion once more. At the end of chapter 31 Moses has the law
stones in hand and is ready to descend. That is just about where
chapter 34 later picks up the story with God parading his glory
before Moses on the mountain top in rehearsal of the passage
God will make in company with the people below. 7 Then the
two stones make their final descent safely, all the way down. And
when at last they are placed in the ark,8" the people embark,
charged by their law and the presence of God.
The story has moved from the revolt in Egypt, to the libera-
tion of the people in the Exodus, to the founding of the nation's
freedom at Sinai. And it is in process of turning north to com-
plete the trajectory when chapter 32 intervenes.8 " The forward
movement is brought to a sharp and unanticipated halt, and its
continuation is thrown into radical doubt.
The story precipitously takes us to the edge of the abyss.
The people have abandoned their being. It is impossible. But it
is done. And what must follow, but that the people and the jour-
ney must end? Having already ended in an act of self-
destruction?
God's speaking in chapter 31 concludes in the two stone
texts. Moses stands there, clutching them, when, in chapter 32,
God's fury breaks out. Facing God, Moses intercedes for Israel.
And his final, intercessory argument in this scene, the one that
85. See id. 19:3-8, 24:1-8.
86. See id. 23:23-33.
87. See id. 34:6-7, 33:17-23. The poetic link between God passing before
Moses and Israel in the company of God passing before other peoples is sug-
gested by the juxtaposition of Exodus 34:6-7 and Exodus 34:8-14.
88. See id. 40:20.
89. To be sure, the text has yet to give us the making of the tabernacle
and vestments. But what reader does not gladly pause for the pre-journey nour-
ishment of the text's wonderful description of the extraordinary tent and its
covering, the ark and mercy seat, the altar, the lamps and hangings, the finely
worked garments, and the robe finished all around the hem with alternating
bells of gold and pomegranates of blue, purple and crimson yam. The details
delight the imagination, and the reading time passes quickly.
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changes God's mind, is the express return of words God had sent
earlier:
Remember Abraham, Isaac, and Israel ... how you swore
to them by your own self, saying to them, "I will multiply
your descendants like the stars of heaven .... " And then
the Lord changed his mind .... Then Moses turned and
went down from the mountain, carrying the two tablets of
stone. 90
God's word sends Moses to Egypt and returns him fruitfully to
Sinai with the gathered Israel. It brings him to the mountain
summit where he will receive more words and where he may now
intercede for the people. And as he speaks, the word assembles
around itself the various arguments he offers. And then-sim-
ply, decisively-it emerges expressly: Moses quotes God to God
to produce a reversal in judgment.91 And the quoted words pro-
vide, as well, an interval for further intercessions. And the fur-
ther intercessions allow the law stones to reach the people. And
these words, too, will have issue. Entailed in God's speaking is a
return and in the hearing a return speaking.
Participation in this cycle leaves all parties-God, Israel, and
Moses-vulnerable in unresolved tension.
A. God
The recent writings of the systematic theologian RobertJen-
son and the biblical theologian- Walter Brueggemann provide a
helpful point of departure.
The Greeks, Jenson notes, assumed that gods-to be gods-
must be immune "to time's contingencies and particularly to
death."92 The Olympian gods are immortal. In the biblical
sagas, Israel begins with no such assumption. Unlike the gods of
Olympus, the God of the biblical sagas is vulnerable to time. In
the stories, He is personally engaged: He changes His mind,
reacts to events, makes threats and repents of them.
90. Exod. 32:13-15. What is to be made of the fact that Moses, in smashing
the stones, erases God's words written by God? Is this an act extending God's
wrath: Moses destroys that which would have mobilized and animated the peo-
ple? Is this an act of mercy: If the words God has written enter the camp at the
moment Israel is in the midst of its festival of idolatry, the word will break out
and consume them? Is this a pedagogical act, as Arthur Jacobson proposes:
Moses' smashing the stones to teach the people that this engraved stone is not
an idol?
91. In the Christian tradition, believers return God's express words to
him in the Lord's Prayer.
92. 1 ROBERT JENSON, SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY 94 (1997).
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Brueggemann points out that the people start with no
generic notion of God at all.93 From the beginning, what they
know of God is what God reveals to them about Himself in rela-
tion to them and their history, along the way. "Even where God
is said to be elsewhere," Brueggemann notes, "this 'elsewhere' is
most often in response to Israel's life, either negatively or posi-
tively."94 God is the God of Israel. He is not detached. He is not
"above the fray"; indeed, He is "at risk in the ongoing life of
Israel."95
When Moses addresses God at Sinai-the word returning to
its speaker-his three intercessions are versions of a single
theme: He appeals to this vulnerability of God. He appeals to
God to be God. He is not speaking from or to a different God.
He is speaking to the God of Israel.
In the first scene, God sees Israel's idolatry. Their worship
of the calf is an act of self-annihilation. God directs Moses to
leave; He wishes to be let alone so that He may consume the
people and make another nation of Moses. But this God,
because He is God, cannot be left alone. Moses' argument is a
reminder that Israel is the nation to which God has committed
himself.96 Israel has done the impossible in its sin. God must
overcome the impossible with the possibility of a future, for He,
no less than Moses, cannot be Himself without Israel. He is the
one who is faithful over against Israel's faithlessness. He cannot
be left alone, and He cannot be left not alone but with another
nation.
In the second scene, Moses acknowledges Israel's sin and
then says: "if you will only forgive their sin-but if not, blot me
out of the book that you have written."97 Moses places himself
fully at risk with Israel. His doing so reminds God that God, too,
is at risk with Israel. What book would there be without Moses?
What God would there be without the book with Moses? God is
the God of this nation in this book.
The third intercession is offered in the tent of meeting. In
the course of it, Moses reminds God "that this nation is your peo-
ple."98 If God is not present with them as they move out for
Canaan, Moses asks, "how shall it be known that I have found
favor in your sight, I and your people, unless you go with us? In
93. See WALTER BRUEGGEMANN, THEOLOGY OF THE OLD TESTAMENT: TESTI-
MONY, DispuTE, ArVocAcy 144 (1997).
94. Id. at 83.
95. Id.




this way, we shall be distinct, I and your people, from every peo-
ple on the face of the earth."99 Without God, Israel could not be
known as God's people. Without this distinction, with only the
mass of humanity, God could not be known as the God of Israel.
What would distinguish Him? To speak for God is to speak for
the people.
B. Moses
Moses is fully invested in the people, prepared to be erased
with them, and yet this leader of Israel is a fugitive Egyptian
prince. And in the course of the long journey through the desert
from Egypt to the promised land, his sister and brother lead a
democratic revolt against him that he puts down.
His relation to God is no less tense. It is so from the begin-
ning. Moses had yielded to God's commission and was returning
to Egypt when "the Lord met him and tried to kill him."1"' The
text offers no mitigating explanation and instead deepens the
mystery. God let him alone, it says, after Zipporah hastily circum-
cised their son and "touched Moses' feet" with the foreskin.101
The tension remains to the end. Moses begs God: "Let me
cross over to see the good land beyond the Jordan, that good hill
country and the Lebanon."10' 2 God rejects his plea. At the end of
the long journey from Egypt, God will not allow Moses to enter
the promised land. This is a painful lack of fulfillment for the
conclusion of a remarkable, deserving life. The confoundment
of it lives on in the stories and minds of the people. His exclu-
sion is a punishment. His offense was committed in the process
of drawing water from a rock.
In the desert, at Meribah, the people grow thirsty. There is
no water. The people and their animals suffer. The people
gather against Moses and Aaron and quarrel with them about
their thirst and the absence of water. The story continues:
The Lord spoke to Moses, saying: "Take the staff, and
assemble the congregation .... and command the rock
before their eyes to yield its water. Thus you shall bring
water out of the rock for them ... "
99. Id. 33:7-23.
100. Id. 4:25. When I read this passage over the telephone to Henry
Schwarzschild, the former director of the ACLU's campaign against capital
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So Moses took the staff from before the Lord, as he
had commanded him. Moses . . .gathered the assembly;
together before the rock, and he said to them, "Listen, you
rebels, shall we bring water for you out of this rock?" Then
Moses lifted up his hand and struck the rock twice with his
staff; water came out abundantly, and the congregation
and their livestock drank. But the Lord said to Moses ...,
"Because you did not trust in me, to show my holiness
before the eyes of the Israelites, therefore you shall not
bring this assembly into the land that I have given
them. 10 3
There are various possibilities for identifying Moses'
offense. 10 4 For example: He was told to speak to the rock, but
he struck it instead or struck it too many times or too hard and
thus evinced lack of trust in the word. Or, when he asked the
people "shall we bring forth water," he was taking credit for the
miracle and thus succumbed to self-glorification, perhaps a ver-
sion of playing God. Or there is no precise explanation of the
details in the text. In any event, the text says he failed to show
God's holiness.1 "5 There is no privilege and much hazard in serv-
ing as God's mouth. Like the rest of the generation of the pio-
neers, he, too, must die without crossing the Jordan.
When the end comes, the text delivers it simply. Moses
climbs to the top of a mountain opposite Jericho:
[A] nd the Lord showed him the whole land ...... This is
the land of which I swore to Abraham, to Isaac, and to
Jacob, saying, 'I will give it to your descendants'; I have let
you see it with your eyes, but you shall not cross over
there." Then Moses, the servant of the Lord, died there in
the land of Moab, at the Lord's command. He was buried
in a valley in the land of Moab, opposite Beth-peor, but no
one knows his burial place to this day. Moses was one hun-
dred twenty years old when he died; his sight was
unimpaired and his vigor had not abated.
10 6
Moses is left outside in an unknown grave.
103. Num. 20:2-13.
104. See, e.g., MEIR STERNBERG, THE POETICS OF BIBLICAL NARRATIVE 107
(1981); PEAKE'S COMMENTARY ON THE BIBLE 225b, 264 (Matthew Black & H.H.
Rawley eds., 1962); Ackerman, supra note 81, at 84-85.





"The Israelites wept for Moses in the plains of Moab thirty
days; then the period of mourning for Moses was ended."' 7
After Moses dies, the people mourn. And then they cease their
mourning. They continue the journey with their God. They are
dismayed. Nonetheless, they, God, the story, and the writer move
on. The terms are the same: There is assurance, but also the
ever-present tension."10
For the people to bear the word through the desert and in
the promised land, they must be holy, and, as Damrosch says, "to
be holy, qadosh, is to be set apart; the root means 'separation,
withdrawal, dedication. . . .' God himself repeatedly makes the
point that the people's separateness is to mirror his own: 'Ye
shall be holy, for I the Lord your God am holy."' 1 09 Their separa-
tion requires certain political connections to others: "you shall
love the alien as yourself, for you were aliens in the land of Egypt:
I am the Lord your God."1 10 But these are connections formed
in motion along the way. This people are aliens in Egypt, then
wanderers in the desert, and their presence in the promised land
"expresses not a sense of possession but a permanence of
exile."' The land was possessed by others when Israel con-
quered it, and Israel, too, can be dispossessed in turn.
The people are displaced, always underway. They are to be
holy for God is holy and therefore a people apart. They can
never rest easy. God shares identity with Israel. As Jenson notes,
however, God is identified with Israel without ceasing to stand
over against her.11 2 God is both settled in Israel and other than
Israel. 13
The settlement of God's word in Israel is unsettling and
remains so. It unsettles Israel in the story, and it unsettles inter-
pretation of the story. In the biblical saga, there will be no "after
all is said and done." There will be, as Brueggemann puts it,
107. Id. 34:8.
108. It ends on what Patrick Miller describes as "a subversive note." PAT_
RICK D. MILLER, DEUTERONOMY, INTERPRETATION: A BIBLE COMMENTARY FOR
TEACHING AND PREACHING 244 (1990).
109. David Damrosch, Leviticus, in LIERARv GUIDE, supra note 81, at 74
(quoting Lev. 19:2).
110. Lev. 19:34.
111. Damrosch, supra note 109.
112. SeeJenson, supra note 92, at 76.
113. Israel needs "to speak of God . . . as a 'settled' participant in her
story with him, who yet is other than the perpetrator of the identification." Id.
"God is identified with Israel in that he is identified as a participant in Israel's
story with him." Id. at 77.
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"another speech, another challenge, another invitation, another
petition, another argument, which will re-open the matter
114 God is both incommensurate with Israel and mutually
engaged with her. In Israel's speech about God, the irresolution
remains. "For after Israel has given witness to the relatedness of
[this God], one who hears the testimony still wonders: What, in
fact is the nature of this relationship?"'1 15
CONCLUSION
A lawyer who accepts that she is to practice justice may bear
in mind the biblical stories in some of which justice is a precise,
practical, active form of regard for those who are types of fellow
exiles and strangers along the way:
For the Lord your God is God of gods and Lord of lords,
the great God, mighty and awesome, who is not partial and
takes no bribe, who executes justice for the orphan and the
widow, and who loves the strangers, providing them food
and clothing. You also shall love the stranger, for you were
strangers in the land of Egypt.1 16
A lawyer who finds that the practice of justice requires con-
textual decisions case by case will certainly want to include the
law and the rules of ethical conduct in her thinking as she
assesses what a case requires of her. But she may also bear in
mind biblical stories according to which all cases, professional
rules, and legal merits themselves have a context:
When your son asks you in time to come, "What is the
meaning of the testimonies and the statutes and the ordi-
nances which the Lord our God has commanded you?"
then you shall [say] to your son, "We were Pharaoh's slaves
in Egypt and the Lord brought us out of Egypt with a
mighty hand ...."117
A lawyer who finds that her contextual decision aboutjustice
leads her to act as counsel for a situation may remember the
story of Moses and how he was free to put himself at risk together
with the other participants. She will know not to expect safety or
certainty but to expect that she will not be alone and will be car-
ried through this like other unstructured moral and legal spaces.
A lawyer who acts as such counsel and in consequence dis-
covers herself in trouble with the bar or the legal system will





remember something else: She will remember that both the bar
and the system are constructed and not given worlds. Walter
Brueggemann observes that the biblical world is one spoken into
availability and that there is, absent speech, no objectively given
world that stands as a measure of the reality of the biblical
one. 1 18 There are many other spoken worlds. Those among
them that are regarded as something other than spoken,
regarded as perhaps necessary or natural, have only been "spo-
ken so long, so authoritatively, and so credibly that they appear
to be given.,, 9 The biblical texts debunk false claims. They do
so not by counterclaiming that their world is more truly given.
They do so by engendering critique and liberation as it is the
nature of the word of God in the story to do. The story serves "as
a subversive protest and as an alternative act of vision .... 20
The Moses saga is thoroughly and patently a world of words.
Beyond the interaction of its particulars with the particulars of
law-the role of rules, lawyering for a situation-it advances a
more general, curing challenge. The American legal system and
its subsidiary institutions like the American Bar Association are
worlds that have been long, authoritatively, and credibly spoken.
Against their settling into the self-destructive attitudes and estab-
lishments of givenness, the Moses saga projects: an unsettling
God, an unsettled people, and a chosen, ravaged man of law.
118. See Brueggemann, supra note 94, at 723.
119. Id.
120. Id. at 713 (emphasis omitted).
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